Commentary on Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, based on Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy.

Contributed seminar papers on perception and verbal testimony in Indian philosophy presented at the national seminar during 16-17 January 2012.

Most analyses of whistleblowing are concerned with the whistleblower as an actor or with the act of whistleblowing itself. However, as soon as the whistleblower enters the public arena, a social dynamic emerges of interdependent actors with different responsibilities and different interests.Such a dynamic demands a more comprehensive approach in which the motives of the different actors in the public debate are taken into account.This approach is developed here using an exemplary case of whistleblowing that took place in a Dutch (...) research institute.The intensive media attention damaged both the institute and the whistleblower.In retrospect this could have been avoided.In our analysis we give extra attention to the motives involved and to the inevitability of media logic.In order to avoid unnecessary damage we recommend guidelines to the three basic actors:the whistleblower, the organization and the media. (shrink)

The ethics of Public Relations is changing: the pragmatical approach is giving way to the dialogical approach. Pragmatical PR Ethics concentrates on issues and cases and hardly has a conceptual core. Dialogical PR Ethics concentrates on procedures and structures and uses symmetric communication as its core concept. Both approaches of PR ethics have their strong and weak points. A metaethical framework is presented to combine both approaches.

The free energy principle is sometimes put forward as accounting for biological self-organization and cognition. It states that for a system to maintain non-equilibrium steady-state with its environment it can be described as minimising its free energy. It is said to be entirely scale-free, applying to anything from particles to organisms, and interactive machines, spanning from the abiotic to the biotic. Because the FEP is so general in its application, one might wonder whether this framework can capture anything specific to (...) biology. We take steps to correct for this here. We first explicate the worry, taking pebbles as examples of an abiotic system, and then discuss to what extent the FEP can distinguish its dynamics from an organism’s. We articulate the notion of ‘autonomy as precarious operational closure’ from the enactive literature, and investigate how it can be unpacked within the FEP. This enables the FEP to delineate between the abiotic and the biotic; avoiding the pebble worry that keeps it out of touch with the living systems we encounter in the world. (shrink)

This study analyzes how ChatGPT portrays and describes itself, revealing misleading myths about AI technologies, specifically conversational agents based on large language models. This analysis allows for critical reflection on the potential harm these misconceptions may pose for public understanding of AI and related technologies. While previous research has explored AI discourses and representations more generally, few studies focus specifically on AI chatbots. To narrow this research gap, an experimental-qualitative investigation into auto-generated AI representations based on prompting was conducted. Over (...) the course of a month, ChatGPT (both in its GPT-4 and GPT-4o models) was prompted to “Draw an image of yourself,” “Represent yourself visually,” and “Envision yourself visually.” The resulting data (n = 50 images and 58 texts) was subjected to a critical exploratory visual semiotic analysis to identify recurring themes and tendencies in how ChatGPT is represented and characterized. Three themes emerged from the analysis: anthropomorphism, futuristic/futurism and (social)intelligence. Importantly, compared to broader AI imaginations, the findings emphasize ChatGPT as a friendly AI assistant. These results raise critical questions about trust in these systems, not only in terms of their capability to produce reliable information and handle personal data, but also in terms of human–computer relations. (shrink)

Whether perception involves the manipulation of representations is currently heavily debated. The embedded view advanced by Nico Orlandi seeks a middle passage between representationalism and radical enactivism. In this paper I argue for a non-representational take on EV. I argue that this is the best way to resolve the objections EV has received from both representationalists and non-representationalists. I analyze this debate, and distinguish four sorts of objections: the objection of the wrongfully cut middleman, the argument against explanatory exclusionism, the (...) case for scientific benefits of representations, and the charge of inconsistent ascription of representational status in EV. I argue that the middleman was never cut in EV, and is controversial to boot, otherwise equal, non-representational explanations have primacy over representational explanations, due to the lack of naturalistic grounds for representations and the unnecessarily ascribed cognitive load to the system. Further, I show that puts the cart before the horse, and the arguments on offer are viciously circular. However, the final objection, lays bare a deeper issue for EV. At the cost of giving up the middle position, however, the explanatory tools already available to EV can be shown to cover the work initially thought to require representation. I conclude that EV is best altered to be a non-representational theory of perception. (shrink)

Autism research is increasingly moving to a view centred around sensorimotor atypicalities instead of traditional, ethically problematical, views predicated on social-cognitive deficits. We explore how an enactivist approach to autism illuminates how social differences, stereotypically associated with autism, arise from such sensorimotor atypicalities. Indeed, in a state space description, this can be taken as a skewing of sensorimotor variables that influences social interaction and so also enculturation and habituation. We argue that this construal leads to autism being treated on a (...) par with other sensorimotor atypicalities such as blindness or atypical height. This leads to our conclusion that, insofar there is an ethical call to inclusion in our public sphere regardless of contingent bodily difference, an enactivist take on autism naturally leads to extending such inclusion to autism. Moreover, our analysis suggests a concrete way forward to achieve inclusion of autistics: by being more attentive to autistic sensorimotor specifics. (shrink)

What does it take to be a consultant in business ethics? Is the role of the ethical consultant like that of an engineer, a playwright or an interpreter? And where are the women consultants? The author is a scientific researcher in Ethics at Nijenrode, The Netherlands School of Business.

We target the ontological and epistemological ramifications of the proposed distinction between Friston and Pearl blankets. We emphasize the need for empirical testing next to computational modeling. A peculiar aspect of the free energy principle (FEP) is its purported support of radically opposed ontologies of the mind. In our view, the objective ontological aspiration itself should be rejected for a pragmatic instrumentalist view.

The free energy principle (FEP) portends to provide a unifying principle for the biological and cognitive sciences. It states that for a system to maintain non-equilibrium steady-state with its environment it must minimise its (information-theoretic) free energy. Under the FEP, to minimise free energy is equivalent to engaging in approximate Bayesian inference. According to the FEP, therefore, inference is at the explanatory base of biology and cognition. In this paper, we discuss a specific challenge to this inferential formulation of adaptive (...) self-organisation. We call it the universal ethology challenge: it states that the FEP cannot unify biology and cognition, for life itself (or adaptive self-organisation) does not require inferential routines to select adaptive solutions to environmental pressures (as mandated by the FEP). We show that it is possible to overcome the universal ethology challenge by providing a cautious and exploratory treatment of inference under the FEP. We conclude that there are good reasons for thinking that the FEP can unify biology and cognition under the notion of approximate Bayesian inference, even if further challenges must be addressed to properly draw such a conclusion. (shrink)

Aristotle’s theology is founded upon his physical studies. Aristotle, originally following the goal of pre-Socratic natural philosophers, has organized a set of philosophical concepts including ousia, matter, form, potentiality, actuality and entelechia to explain natural changes and motions. His way of study, therefore, is based on experience and observation. In this way, he has proved the existence of an unmoved mover and presented a concept of God. Yet, the failures and ambiguities of the concepts, their essential state of naturality and (...) Aristotle`s main mental concern in solving the problem of nature have led to an ambiguous and defective view in the field. (shrink)

Lectures based on the commentaries on Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa.

Predictive processing is an increasingly popular approach to cognition, perception and action. It says that the brain is essentially a hierarchical prediction machine. It is typically construed in a representationalist and inferentialist fashion so that the brain makes contentful inferences on the basis of representational models. In this paper, I argue that the predictive processing framework is inconsistent with this epistemic position. In particular, I argue that the combination of hierarchical modeling, contentful inferentialism and representationalism entail an internal inconsistency. Specifically, (...) for a particular set of states, there will be both a representation requirement and not. Yet a system cannot both be required to represent a certain set of states and not be required to represent those states. Due to this contradiction, I propose to reject the standard view. I suggest that predictive processing is best interpreted in terms of reliable covariation instead, entailing an instrumentalist approach to the statistical machinery. (shrink)

Where does enactivism fit on the question of realism or idealism for perception? In recent years all general positions have been argued to be adequate. I will argue that enactivism is neither realist nor idealist, and requires a completely different game altogether. In short: it is not idealist because it sees cognition as inherently world-involving, and isn’t realist because it emphasizes the agent’s role in shaping the world through our own historical, bodily activity. More generally, I argue that the question (...) itself assumes a reified, abstract notion of perception. This introduces a wedge between organism and environment that is incompatible with enactivism’s view of organism and environment as mutually constitutive. This problematizes the intermediate position between realist and idealist extremes as has traditionally been argued for in enactivism. I also touch on the ethical implications of this question, and how enactivism provides a promising path to grapple with the contradiction of the objective, shared space and our individual, historically shaped encounters with it. In sum, I suggest it is time for enactivism to go off the beaten path, and lay its own path in walking again. (shrink)

This aim of this paper is two-fold: it critically analyses and rejects accounts blending active inference as theory of mind and enactivism; and it advances an enactivist-dynamic understanding of social cognition that is compatible with active inference. While some social cognition theories seemingly take an enactive perspective on social cognition, they explain it as the attribution of mental states to other people, by assuming representational structures, in line with the classic Theory of Mind. Holding both enactivism and ToM, we argue, (...) entails contradiction and confusion due to two ToM assumptions widely known to be rejected by enactivism: that social cognition reduces to mental representation and social cognition is a hardwired contentful ‘toolkit’ or ‘starter pack’ that fuels the model-like theorising supposed in. The paper offers a positive alternative, one that avoids contradictions or confusion. After rejecting ToM-inspired theories of social cognition and clarifying the profile of social cognition under enactivism, that is without assumptions and, the last section advances an enactivist-dynamic model of cognition as dynamic, real-time, fluid, contextual social action, where we use the formalisms of dynamical systems theory to explain the origins of socio-cognitive novelty in developmental change and active inference as a tool to demonstrate social understanding as generalised synchronisation. (shrink)

The film The Insider offers an interesting story of leaking inside information by one character and clear whistleblowing by another. In both cases moral considerations are involved on a personal, professional, organizational and public level. As such the film can be used as an inviting cinematic introduction to applied or practical ethics. Three models of practical ethics are introduced. In the film workshop these models are the framework for the film analysis. A set up of the workshop is sketched, including (...) selected scenes, basic questions and a timetable. Also a sketch is given of the results that can be expected. (shrink)

Papers presented at the conference held in 2003-2004 at Ahmedabad, India, organized by Department of Philosophy, Gujarat University.

This article introduces the notion of social synaesthesia as a means of theorizing about mindbody—society relationships. Following a brief discussion of synaesthesia, the concept of social synaesthesia is developed. This concept is then illustrated using photic (light) experiences among devotees in a religious group. It is argued that these experiences illustrate the materialization or embodiment of the experience of charisma in a leader’s presence. It is also suggested that such experiences are more intense and vivid forms of the quotidian tendency (...) to ‘make the word flesh’ — that is, express cognitive-emotional experiences in a physical idiom. Bioagency (as a locus of embodied charisma) is then discussed as the process through which the ‘word is made flesh’. The conclusion argues that just as synaesthetic experiences point to an interpenetration and melding of sensory modalities and challenge mindbody dualism, social synaesthesia calls into question mindbody/social dualisms. Finally, such experiences are seen as more vivid and intense forms of ordinary human capacities. (shrink)

Consultancy firms inform, advise, implement and mediate in their own interests and in the interests of their clients. We can only guess if their work is also in the interest of the public. There is no critical and systematical assessment of the behavior of consultancy firms. What roles do consultancy firms chose? And what arguments do they use? In the nineties the international consultancy firm Hill & Knowlton took on two assignments that showed a remarkable difference in the required role (...) the firm had to play. In the first role the firm acted as an impartial advocate, in the second role the firm acted as a political agent. An analysis of the argumentation for both roles shows us the familair short-sighted choice for the annual turnover at the cost of internal and external trustworthiness. In this decade consultancy firms will need to develop ethical assessments that meet more professional standards. (shrink)